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ABSTRACT  
Contradictions in Community: Ecuador’s Plurinational Case  
  
  
Rebekah Burnham  
Department of International Studies  
Texas A&M University  
  
  
Research Advisor: Dr. Maddalena Cerrato  
Department of International Studies  
Texas A&M University  
  
  
Literature Review  
  Previous scholars have widely theorized upon the idea of community and its connection 
the nation-state. Benedict Anderson, whose approach to the problematic of the nation became a 
classic, defines it as an “imagined political community.” Étienne Balibar challenged the 
primordial nation and spoke of internal exclusions inherently caused by nation-states. This raises 
the question of whether internal exclusions can be overcome in a nation marked by 
multinationality. Recently, the idea of a plurinational nation-state has been introduced, catalyzing 
a change to the approach of previous theories of community. The problems of a nation-state 
increase exponentially when multiple community forms are politically combined within state 
borders. Raúl Zibechi contextualized this problem when he wrote about Ecuador, which has 
created a plurinational constitution. Independent communities are now becoming homogenized 
as one overarching community. Literature regarding the organization of the world into 
nationstates, the idea of plurinationalism and the contradictions to traditional renderings of 
community raise the question of how diverse groups with seemingly nothing in common become 
a community.  
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Thesis Statement  
  Given the idea that the congruence with a cultural community is what gives legitimacy to 
the political unit, what kind of legitimacy can come from a community that defines itself as 
plural? Can pluralism be the basis and the glue for a wider community explicitly imagined to 
support/legitimize the existence of a state? Can the idea of plurinationalism help solve the 
inherent contradictions created by communities?  
Theoretical Framework  
  This research thesis will be grounded in theoretical inquires on communities and 
nationstates from a variety of fields including anthropology, sociology and philosophy.    
Project Description  
Traditional renditions of the idea of community have faced many new critiques in the 
face of our increasingly globalized world that has come to be organized into national 
communities, or nation-states. Following a transdisciplinary and critical approach I intend to 
address the problem by asking: ‘How does a diverse group of people, in a world in which 
uniformity offers legitimacy to the nation-state, become a community? How can diversity can be 
overcome or even become itself the common ground that holds together a community?’ These 
theoretical questions will lead me to inquire the idea of plurinationalism, which attempts to tie 
together various national identities into one community of citizens of the same nation-state. This 
research will seek to form a connection between the idea of plurinationalism and the concept of 








Community is an idea that has taken many forms and subsequently offers no decisive 
definition. Because of the ambiguity regarding the concept of community, I will seek to 
understand community as it relates to the nation-state, specifically in order to understand the 
emerging phenomenon that is plurinationalism. Ernest Gellner’s definition of the nation-state has 
come to be accepted by scholars as the correct delineation of nation-states. Nation-states are 
based upon the principle of nationalism, which holds that the political unit and cultural unit 
should be congruent in order to produce political legitimacy. Nationalism is therefore the 
principle that lends political legitimacy to a nation, and nationalism is likewise the foundation 
from which the nation is produced. Given the idea that the congruence with a cultural community 
is what gives legitimacy to the political unit, what kind of legitimacy can come from a 
community that defines itself as plural? Can pluralism be the basis and the glue for a wider 
community explicitly imagined to support/legitimize the existence of a state?   
To begin to analyze, explain, and further understand these questions, it is necessary to 
begin with the cultural aspect of the idea of nation-states, which can be conceived of as the 
community. I employ Roberto Esposito’s theory, which states that community is both necessary 
and impossible, to form my own understanding of the national community. Within the 
nationstate, community is that which offers legitimacy to the nation, and that which exists as an 
unfulfilled project. As such, the national community is both necessary and impossible.  
Throughout the national communities’ inception, reproduction, and subsequent exclusionary 
tendencies, these two fundamentals are shows. In keeping with Gellner’s principle of 
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nationalism, which holds that the congruence between the political unit and the cultural 
community is what offers legitimacy to the nation-state, we can come to the conclusion that the 
cultural community is fundamentally necessary for the fulfillment of the principle of nationalism 
because it justifies the political unit through this perceived “unity.” Likewise, the national 
community exists as a constant project, which points to the impossibility of the true existence of 
a national community. The duality of the concept of a national community allows for an 
understanding of plurinationalism  Previously, the concept of plurinationalism formed a 
theoretical problem for the principle of nationalism because it creates a disjuncture between 
cultural and political boundaries; however, when we understand the political unit constantly 
creates and projects uniformity with the cultural unit, plurinationalism simply offers an example 
of how true uniformity within the nation-state never reaches actualization. To explain the 
paradox of the national community as necessary and impossible, we must first begin by 












CHAPTER I  
COMMUNITY AS IT EXISTS  
  
Creation of Community  
  To understand community one must first seek to understand the conditions in which man 
exists, namely, the conditions in which man is born into to a necessary communal existence. 
Existence without human interaction is wholly impossible, as biology has shown. Human beings 
initially need others for their coming into existence, and likewise for primary care, which in turn 
transitions into life in a communal existence. In this way, Esposito posits that community is 
necessary for mankind; it is the “transcendental condition of our existence,” (14). At the same 
time, Esposito regards community as impossible because the originary condition of mankind as 
existing in community precedes “every possible realization,” (15). He writes that the only true 
community would be a community in which all personal human interest is overcome, which is 
unrealizable. “It must, says the simple law that demands it, remain a simple idea in reason, or an 
unrealizable goal, a pure destination,” Esposito writes (20). In this way, community is a 
condition of human existence that can never be fully achieved. The paradox that Esposito 
enunciated has formed the foundation of my own understanding of the idea of the national 
community. Just as community is necessary and impossible for all mankind, within the 
nationstate, community is that which offers legitimacy to the nation (necessary) and exists as an 
unfulfilled project (impossible).  In order to further explain this paradox, it is necessary to 
understand how an idea of the national community is created within a nation-state, and how its 
creation is perceived as fundamentally necessary for the legitimation of the nation-state.   
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In keeping with Gellner’s conception of nationalism as the congruence between the 
political unit and cultural community which lends legitimacy to the nation, we may necessarily 
come to the conclusion that this cultural unit is a foundational, albeit ambiguous, aspect of any 
nation-state. As such, I seek to understand community as a concept which implies a national 
community which is inherently cultural; it is likewise used to justify political territories and has 
formed the basis for scholar’s understanding of the nation-state. It is precisely the previously  
mentioned ambiguity surrounding the idea of community that this research seeks to clarify.   
By associating the idea of community with the “cultural unit” that, through its congruence 
with the political unit, offers legitimacy to the nation, it is first useful to understand how (and in 
what ways) national communities are formed. In his Imagined Communities, cultural 
anthropologist Benedict Anderson defines the nation as an “imagined political community” that 
is imagined as both limited and sovereign (Anderson 6). The use of imagination is a vital element 
in the creation of community, as individuals never truly know all other individuals within their 
community, but must conceive of others and their communal existence through imagination. 
Anderson very briefly responds to Gellner’s idea of nations as invented by retorting that nations 
should be understood as imagined rather than fictitious. Gellner posits that there is a myth, which 
he refers to as “the nationalist myth,” surrounding traditional conceptions of nations. He says that 
nations, specifically nation-states, are viewed as latent entities waiting an  
“awakening,” (Gellner 45). Gellner surmises that nations as “in the nature of things” is a false 
notion, because in reality nations, or the nationalism that justifies nations, becomes necessary in 
an industrialized age. Though Gellner’s depiction of the nation brings to light the fictitious idea 
of “sleeping beauty nations,” he does not reduce nations and nationalism to simple inventions or 
fabrication as Anderson declares that he does. Rather, Gellner says that nationalism is “the 
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crystallization of new units, suitable for the conditions now prevailing, though admittedly using 
their raw material the cultural, historical and other inheritances from the pre-nationalist world,” 
(Gellner 48). This crystallization denotes a pre-existence of certain aspects, whether cultural or 
historical, that are then formed to suit the age of industrialization from which Gellner writes. 
Rather than complete fabrication, nationalism seems to be a creation that is then used as a 
justification of political legitimacy. Nationalism is largely a political theory that bases political 
territory on the perceived cultural community in order to lend legitimacy to itself. Anderson’s 
work in Imagined Communities has portrayed the national community as that which is created 
through imagination, and has since been used by scholars across many disciplines. The 
imagining of this cultural community, as Anderson states, is both limited and sovereign, which 
allows for the territorial delineation of the nation to coincide with the community.     
The principle of nationalism has therefore been thought of by the two scholars in 
relationship to its “origin.” Anderson comes to the conclusion that nationalism, as a system of 
meaning, has come to replace the previously dominant practice of religion. Both nationalism and 
religion are systems that organize meaning for the community. Anderson writes that the onset of 
nationalist thought began to take root when previously shared understandings about the nature of 
mankind, a nature formed namely through religious understanding of ‘divine truth’ that created a 
common worldview, began to subside. With the decline of this common basis of community 
came an opening for a new way of thinking about the concept of community. He theorizes that 
this opening for a “search for fraternity” was then increased by print capitalism, and eventually 
led to the induction of the concept of nationalism. In saying so, Anderson never surmises that 
nationalism as a dominant practice is necessary, unlike Gellner, who concludes that with the 
closure of the agrarian age and the onset of industrialization, nationalism was the subsequent 
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outcome. “High culture,” or Gellner’s conception of those literate cultures that consciously seek 
to reproduce themselves, existed as dominant during the agrarian age but did not define the 
political limit. This changes with the dawn of industrialization; high culture during 
industrialization “badly needs political support and underpinning,” (Gellner 48-49). Thus, 
Gellner uncovers the myth of nationalism and the weakness that lies in viewing the nation as a 
natural destiny, but he risks falling into a similar paradigm when he goes on to treat the “age of  
nationalism” as a necessary consequence of modernity.   
The community exists through the imagination, but likewise is presented as preceding its  
“fusion” with the recognized nation. Both Anderson and Gellner recognize the fallacy in viewing 
nations as natural, but still imply the existence of a preexisting concept which is transformed in 
the name of nationalism. To Gellner, the inherited cultural or historical factors are changed to 
suit the use of the nation. To Anderson, the preexisting religious community organization is 
dismissed and thus occurs the onset of the practice of nationalism.   
What both scholars suggest is that a system of meaning, which for Anderson is religion 
and for Gellner is agrarianism, is replaced by a more novel system of meaning that is the age of 
nationalism. While both scholars create innovative theories on the idea of the national 
community, they both seek to explain the ways the nation-state exists by looking to the past and 
showing a linear transformations of cultural systems into what we now know as the nation-state. 
The crucial point here is that systems of meaning form commonality amongst groups of people; 
the novelty is that these cultural systems are portrayed as congruent with the political boundaries 
of the state. The scholars provide justification for the present reality of nation-states by providing 
a historical framework which precedes the age of nationalism.   
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While both scholars employ a narrative that formed a time suitable for the age of 
nationalism, Appadurai exposes the linear fallacy that is perpetuated when we view a community 
as falling within a relatively stable territory throughout history, and thus necessitating the 
existence of a defined geography. For Anderson and Gellner, the abatement of previous systems 
of meaning within stable spacial arenas is replaced with the age of nationalism, and the inception 
of nation-states is then portrayed as a natural transformation of history. Instead, Appadurai 
articulates that it is “histories that produce geographies, not vice versus,” (66). A crucial point to 
note regarding the idea of histories producing geographies is that historical agents are those who 
interpret history, and therefore produce history as an interpretation of events. The element of 
imagination, which is discussed in the work of Anderson, is similarly regarded in Appadurai’s 
writing when he speaks of the “work of the imagination” which is necessary to produce 
geographies. Instead of imagining the present community through entities such as newspapers (as 
Anderson posits), an imagining of past communities is possible through history. Historical 
interpretations allows national communities to imagine a history that presents itself as the 
necessary transformation of the national community to its ultimate destination: the nation-state. 
The past communities are then presented by historical agents as stable entities which shifted, 
transformed, and culminated in the present geographical layout. Thus, any geography, including 
the nation-state, is formed through the historical factors which create it, and subsequently the 
historical actors within the nation-state that produced the geography are affected by the 
geography itself. “Histories that produce geographies” shows the fallacy that occurs when 
viewing geography as a stable entity throughout history.   
Just as Appadurai posits that historical interpretations of the past produce special 
territories, Etienne Balibar directly presents the “retrospective illusion” that allows national 
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identity to be perceived as preceding the nation. He writes that the current nation-state in which 
one exists consistently projects into the past a history that consists of a series of events which 
ultimately must manifest into the current national identity. The events selected create an image of 
the nation-state as intended to exist long before its existence reached “actuation.” However, the 
“liner destiny” created by the nation itself pulls distinct events and happenings, quite often 
uncorrelated circumstances, in order to procure an image of the nation as an inherent destiny 
(Balibar 86-88). As such, the cultural community is often the retrospective illusion used in the 
attribution of the nation-state as the fulfillment of a the necessary culmination of the community 
into the nation-state.   
In his “A Metonymic Community?” Thomas Claviez likewise remarks on the  
transformation of the past to serve the purpose of a nation’s present.  
 “For a community to “occur,” that is, for it to have left its state of contingent possibility  
and achieved actuality- it has to narrate its own, contingent roots and original potentia as  
a teleological narrative designed to overcome contingency by means of (which means to  
reformulate it as) necessity, which turns the passive Schicksal (fate) into active Geschick   
(destiny),” (45).   
This “occurrence” of community is most realized when it becomes congruent with the 
nationstate, or when it reaches political actuality. Claviez rightfully uses quotation marks around 
occur to show the linear projection of the community as an entity that precedes its actuation with 
the nation-station. As such, the contingent nation-state grounds itself through the use of the 
community as destiny, when even the community upon which it legitimizes its being is equally 
contingent.   
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All of the aforementioned scholars point to the irremissible idea, though they do not 
explicitly state, that the national community is only “realized,” or rather, is perceived to come 
into existence, by its relationship to the political unit or to the state. The existence of the national 
community is only perceived after its culmination with the state, and is likewise projected as 
having been present long before this “culmination.” However, the community still only exists as 
it is imagined. That is to say, the national community is never truly actuated, but claims to reach 
realization (but we understand that realization exists in imagination) when it becomes congruent 
with the state. The two ideas, cultural community and political sphere, are therefore quite 
inseparable factors in the nation-state because the nation-state legitimizes its existence by 
projecting cultural uniformity that not only shares congruence with its territorial borders, but also 
naturally pre-existed the political territory in which it now exists. This is precisely why 
plurinationalism poses such a distinct challenge to traditional renditions of the nation. However, 
the present nation in which one exists constructs the concept of the a cultural community in order 
to justify/legitimize itself. If the summation of a nation-state is built, constructed, and continually 
projected as being based upon a national community, then this community is a necessary tool in 
the justification of the nation-state. The question “did community exist before the nation-state?” 
can never be answered precisely because the community being discussed is a political 
community, a product of the nation-state, yet the community is projected/imagined/presented to 
be based upon something other than a political connection. In other words, the community can 
never be separated from the political unit because it is a political conception, an imagined one, 
though it is made to seem as if it were something beyond, or more deeply rooted than a simple 
political idea. he national community is a necessary creation on behalf of the state because it 
forms a perceived sense of unity, which in turn gives political power legitimacy, but it is a 
12  
concept that has been re-fabricated to suit the needs of the nation-state. Thus, the community is a 
constant project of the nation, though it is presented as an already fulfilled project because of its  
“culmination” in the nation-state. The national community is therefore an inherently unfulfilled 
project, though it believes itself to be fulfilled. In this way, the community seeks fulfillment that 
masquerades as continuity.   
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CHAPTER II  
COMMUNITY AS IT PERSISTS  
  
Continuity of Community  
  Community is presented as an entity that preceded the nation-state and culminated with 
its congruence to the state, which allows the community to be presented as an already fulfilled 
project. Legitimacy is granted to the nation-state by the perpetuation of this image, and the 
unrealizable reality of community is masked, allowing an unfulfilled project to be masked as the 
continuity of the present community. As Esposito stated, the community is a destination, though 
it exists as if it were a continuation.   
  This disguised unfulfillment is precisely what Balibar theorized when he spoke of the 
illusion of national identity. As I previously mentioned, the presentation of the nation as the 
culmination of a series of events that was an inherent destiny allowed distinct events to fall under 
the guise of a prior common cultural community within a fairly stable territorial region. In turn, 
this narrative of the nation allows it to be presented as an entity that is as equally destined to 
continue forever as it was destined to exist in the first place. Thus, as community did not 
naturally happen to become a nation-state, the national community does not naturally reproduce 
itself, but instead requires a deliberate method of “producing the people,” (93). The community 
exists as an unfulfilled project, though it believes itself to be fulfilled. The striving of the 
community to perpetuate itself is then actually a striving of the community to reach its 
fulfillment. This is not to say that the nation itself does not exist, but instead the unifying cultural 
community that it bases itself upon is always in a state of perfectibility. In other words, the 
community is never actuated or realized, but exists as a “community in striving.”   
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  The question then becomes one of the reproduction of the national community, though 
this reproduction is a disguised strive for fulfillment. National communities do not inherently 
pass down from generation to generation, which presents a challenge for the community to 
continue in existence. National community must be seen as natural for the uncritical acceptance 
of such a community to prevail, so the people must be continually reproduced in a manner that 
does not question the reasoning behind their allegiance to a nation.  
In the context of Balibar’s argument, this ‘producing of the people’ is a key component of the way 
nations exist and are perceived to continually exist. Unity gives power legitimacy, so a production 
of unity would necessarily lead to a production of political legitimacy. People are produced through 
daily practices, but it is important to note that unity takes place at the individual level as well as 
the mass level. It is not just the inclusion of individuals into the established community, but instead 
the individuals produce the community. Essentially, the people produce themselves as a people 
(Balibar 93-94). Up until this point I have purposely focused on the role that the state has played 
in the creation of an imagined national community, but who is it that forms the nationstate? The 
people of the nation. Thus, it is the same people who misunderstand their national community to 
be a the base and glue for the political unit. In this way, the imagined community is not simply 
constructed by a conscious few, but is produced and in a state of constant perfectibility by the 
masses.   
Balibar then goes on to suggest that the production of the people as a people takes place 
through “the naturalization of belonging and the sublimation of the ideal nation,” (96). In other 
words, the naturalization of belonging, or creation of what Balibar calls a “fictive ethnicity,” is 
used to create the projection of both the past and the future as a natural community. In other words, 
the construction of the people as a national community is necessary for the justification of the 
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state’s power. Balibar uses the word “fictive” to describe the way the community is instituted. The 
use of the word is used to convey a fabrication rather than a falsification. Fiction is typically 
regarded as something that is not real, whereas Balibar uses the term to describe something that is 
produced as if it were real (96). This means that the national community is fictively created by the 
nation-state so that fictive ethnicity is regarded as natural, as something that must necessarily exist. 
Language and race, to Balibar, are the ways in which fictive ethnicity is produced because they are 
made to seem as inherent qualities of our existence. Thus, fictive ethnicity becomes necessary for 
the creation of community as natural, while in this case “natural” would be the antithesis of  
“fictive.”    
As the creation of a fictive ethnicity seeks to continually “reproduce” the national 
community, the “sublimation of the ideal nation” likewise seeks to perfect the national community. 
The process of sublimation is powerful precisely because it is an imperceptible process which 
typically results in exclusions. The two processes are indispensable for the creation of an ideal 
nation, and can be equated with the constant project of producing the national community.   
  Eric Hobsbawm’s idea of invented traditions, which are those practices which seek to 
create norms of behavior through repetition and “normally attempt to establish continuity with a 
suitable historic past,” shows a pattern of projection into the future based upon a perceived 
communal past. This becomes quite the paradox when we recall the fictitious construction of  
national histories, as Balibar posited with his idea of a retrospective illusion. Hobsbawm writes 
that modern traditions often transform and institutionalize older, customary practices, and thus 
fabricate a continuity with the past (7). Thus, invented traditions are in a constant state of 
reinvention through imposed repetition. Traditions are not a standstill invention, but require 
deliberate and repetitive ritualization. The power that invented traditions contain is best 
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understood when we recall that the traditions themselves, especially those regarding the nation 
and nationalism, are not perceived to be a form of social engineering, as they ought to be 
understood. Hobsbawm writes that it is through invented traditions that social cohesion, the 
legitimation of authority, and socialization occur. All three of these forms of invented tradition 
are crucial aspects of the constant project of creating a national community.   
  Now, in order to understand how invented traditions hold an emotional sentiment over 
individuals who form a part of the invented tradition itself, it is useful to understand Balibar’s 
idea of normalization. While the nation-state itself can be viewed as an invented tradition, it is 
the “structures of hegemony,” as Balibar writes, that create each individual’s uncritical 
acceptance of what is “normal.” Through institutions, such as the family and education, an idea 
of what is normal in social interactions with others is displayed and consequently becomes so 
heavily manifested in the individual that any idea of normal goes unquestioned. It is through the 
process of normalization that members of society learn how to interact in community if they are 
to be respected and heard (Ambiguous Universality 62-63). The idea of normalization then is a 
process that allows the unfulfilled national community to strive for fulfillment through the 
institutionalized display of normal societal behaviors. These behaviors, in turn, procure a process 
of sublimation of the nation. Likewise, normalization contributes to the creation of the invented 
tradition that is the nation-state, as it is a method of “inventing” the nation.   
  One way the constant project of creating the national community is accurately shown is 
through Billig’s concept of “banal nationalism,” in which a dialectical relationship is formed 
through forgetting and remembering, allowing the nation to be created. Billig writes that we 
continuously forget both our own nationalism and the reproduction of our nation (184-186). A 
collective amnesia is formed as nations forget the daily repetition of “banal nationalism,” and 
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subsequently mistake only overheated nationalist moments as nationalism. Nationalism is then 
seen as a negative concept that threatens the nation-state, when it is in reality the factor that 
allows for the reproduction of the nation-state itself. Thus, it is the banal nationalism that is 
reiterated daily that allows the continuity of the nation. Likewise, the forgetting of negative 
historical events and perpetuation of the positive historical factors that “led” to the nation allows 
the national community to be viewed as natural. Billig offers a germane example of banal 
nationalism when he writes about waved and unwaved flags. In certain instances, which are what  
Billig calls “waved flags,” the national flag is a symbol that incurs certain actions, such as a 
salute, moment of silence, or a hand placed over the heart. However, the “unwaved flag,” which 
are flags found in photographs or flags that fly on a daily basis and go unperceived, demands no 
pageantry. These daily encounters with unwaved flags offer the quintessential depiction of banal 
nationalism, and they contribute to a process Billig refers to as “enhabitaion,” (189). The daily 
reproduction of nationalism is an unconscious process that contributes to Hobsbawm’s concept 
of invented traditions. By equating nationalism as a negative, overheated idea, the nationalism 
that the nation-state is wholly based upon becomes forgotten, allowing the national community 
to continually strive to reach the unrecognizable community form, all the while never conceiving 
of itself as an entity that needs to be continually produced. This incognizant process then 
becomes a primary reason that nationalism hold the power to legitimize a nation-state precisely 
because of its unperceptable nature.    
  The reproduction of a community, as I have shown, is produced by the people of a nation, 
and requires daily reiteration in order to succeed. But, the process of reproduction is an 
unconscious process that takes place through each individual, as well as through the institutions 
set in place by the state. As I understand community to be an unrealizable destination, the 
18  
constant reproduction of a community is in reality an endeavor to achieve the unachievable 
community form, which is likewise thought to have been accomplished in the past. It is in the 
process of continuation (strife for fulfillment) that the problem of exclusion occurs, which is the 
next problem this research seeks to understand.   
Community through Exclusion  
Another method in which the national community seeks fulfillment is through the 
exclusion of others that is both internal and external. Because the national community is based on 
a perceived cultural unit, it exists as opposed to anything that does not fit this community. In this 
way, just as we can only perceive of our own existence because of our relationship to other 
human beings, the community can only conceive of itself in relationship to other communities. 
The tendency to conceive of an entity through its relationship to other entities can lead to a 
production of difference that allows the community to perceive of itself as necessary. In other 
words, anything exists only as far as it is defined by those things it exists against. Through all of 
the aforementioned scholars and theories, I have shown the necessary unity of community in 
order to legitimize the nation-state, but the projection of unity results from a process of exclusion 
that is necessary to produce perceived unity. By including members into a national community, 
and then projecting this inclusion as a natural connection that has latently awaited an awakening 
through the acquisition of a congruent territorial/political unit, there must necessarily be a 
process of exclusion of individuals who are not part of this “natural community.” In the words of 
Balibar, “The conditions that define belonging also ipso facto identify non-belonging…” (73).      
 Going back to the principle of nationalism, which is the correspondence of the cultural 
community and the political community, the nation-state then becomes a system that often seeks 
to find fulfillment through exclusion of those individuals or groups who lack the necessary 
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cultural community. This cultural community, as we have seen, is produced as if it were a 
longstanding, natural phenomenon making inclusion appear to be deeply rooted, and exclusion 
simply a necessary process in the communities’ fulfillment.   
  Both Castels and Torpey express similar ideas when it comes to the idea of membership, 
or that which allows an individual to access the national community. Once a state becomes a 
nation-state, the political unit then holds “the monopoly of legitimate means of movement,” 
according to Torpey. The implications of the scholar’s corollary to Weber’s conception of the 
monopoly on the legitimate means of violence become apparent when the idea of membership is 
recalled. When the politically sovereign state contains the monopoly of movement into and 
within its territory, the problem is then created of deciding who is a member and who is a 
nonmember. As the principle of nationalism holds, the cultural community should be congruent 
with the political unit, so those individuals within the territory are presumed to be members of 
the common cultural group or community. Thus, according to this principle, those who are 
“others,” or those non-members of the cultural community, are blocked from movement into the 
sovereign state. Castels writes that the state is the only power that holds the authority to grant 
individuals this membership, which is called citizenship. However, there are different levels of 
membership granted to individuals within the nation-state, which is seen through Castel’s 
distinction between active and passive citizens. Going back to Torpey, who believes the two 
aspects of a state’s control of borders are territorial access and establishment, we can see that it is 
the state who is afforded to opportunity to distinguish between members and non-members and 
subsequently can implement various levels of this membership. Castels poses a quintessential 
question that is applicable to my own research when he asks, “National identity is often asserted 
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through a process of exclusion - feelings of belonging depend on being able to say who does not 
belong.  
But if the other is part of society (as a worker, parent, or tax-payer, for example), how can 
national distinctiveness be maintained?” (302). This question, regarding the other that is within  
society, can be likewise asked of plurinationalism.     
In “A Metonymic Community,” Claviez articulates community as that which seeks to 
protect against contingency, and in the process of immunization against contingency, the 
community often is led to exclusion (53-54). However, Claviez points out the erroneous 
tendency to reduce exclusion to something that solely takes place outside of the whole 
community, for the “walling in” of our community then augments the number of potential 
contingencies within the nation. Thus, there are forms of exclusion that take place through 
closing of the nation-state to all outsiders, but there still exists the exclusions that occur within its 
own borders. The idea of an augmented number of internal contingencies can best be understood 
through Balibar’s concept of “internal exclusions.”   
The national community often excludes “others” by perceiving of itself as opposed to 
outsiders, and in the form of the nation-state, this exclusion takes place through the 
implementation of external borders that protect the territorial sovereignty of the national 
community. However, Balibar writes of the “gray area” that is necessarily conceived due to the 
idea of the “levels of membership” we have previously discussed. When we understand the idea 
of foreignness as something that is against our own national community, we depict this idea of 
foreignness as being tied to certain attributes, often anthropological attributes such as gender, 
race, and language; a “fictive ethnicity” is often used to justify the difference between member 
and non-member. Thus, when there are individuals living within the nation-state, who cannot be 
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contrived of as non-citizens but who do not meet the fictive standards for full membership, a 
process of internal exclusion occurs. Internal exclusions show how the process of projecting 
foreignness into the internal space of a community becomes an attempt to transform of the 
national community towards fulfillment. In other words, the process of internal exclusion is a 
result of the unfulfilled project that is the community, and in seeking to perfect its own ideal 
community, those individuals caught in between member and non-member become excluded in 
their own space.   
The following passage from Balibar’s “Citizenship and Exclusion” thoroughly captures 
the idea of a community in striving:    
Thus, the constituent relationship between community and exclusion can begin to  
function in the opposite direction; instead of a pre-existing definition of community,  
predisposed to make the simple differentiation between citizen and non-citizen, reality is  
created out of an unresolved conflict, one which never stops evolving, which for the most  
part takes place “behind the scenes” of citizenship (or on another stage of the political),  
and whose stakes are discriminatory violence, inequalities in statuses and rights, whose  
anthropological “material” is sexual, racial, religious, cultural… Through this conflict,  
the institutional community is mirrored by an “imagined community,” just as the external 
border comes to be mirrored by an internal border, but it is also politically transformed,  
whether it be in the direction of restriction or expansion. (74)  
This passage falls under the first of Balibar’s theses regarding inclusion and exclusion, which 
posits that there is a co-occurrence of violence, or dual violence, on the sides of both inclusion 
and exclusion. Because the process of inclusion can contain its own elements of violence, it 
becomes transformed and transforms its political reality. In other words, the process of excluding 
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others is not the only method in which the community seeks refinement, for the process of 
inclusion (often one of assimilation) can be its own violent refinement. The constant evolvement 
of an unresolved conflict, leading to political reality, can be equated with the idea of the 
unrealizable reality that is community, or community that exists only as a destination (Esposito).  
It is through the constant strife to become “the more perfect” community that the national 
community continually exists, and through which the political realities (often violent realities) 
are continually created. In the words of Castels, “the development of national consciousness is a 
difficult and as yet incomplete process,” (emphasis added 306). The irony of the idea of national 
consciousness, however, is that it is always presented as being complete, which allows the 
community to then perceive who is a member and who is not a member. Yet, how can a national 
community, that is not conclusively defined, project individuals as “other” if it is in the process 
of defining its own national consciousness? In order to answer this question, we may turn once 
again to Appadurai, whose work in “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural  
Economy” can help us remedy the paradox.  
Appadurai’s concept of “constructed primordialism” can help us understand how an 
incomplete national consciousness is contrived of as a complete community and is 
simultaneously used as the justification of internal and external exclusions. Undoubtedly, an 
entity that is primordial cannot be an entity that is constructed, for they are contradictory terms. 
However, communities or ethnicities are constructed as if they were primordial groupings. This 
idea is not novel when we consider the generous scholarship previously mentioned throughout 
this research points to the idea of a community that is presented as preceding its ultimate 
culmination with the nation-state. When an entity, such as the national community, is constructed 
to be seen as primordial, it uses attributes such as language or ethnicity to conceive of the 
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community as long standing in history. It ties its primordialism to an attribute that is constructed 
to be viewed an inherent; in doing so, history becomes a key factor to its success. An incomplete 
national consciousness then moves towards complete consciousness by attaching nationality to a 
certain attribute, paradoxically presenting the national community to be primordial while 
constructing the idea of primordialism on a daily basis. Therefore, an incomplete national 
consciousness which seeks to exclude “the other” is less of a paradox than it is a necessary 
consequence of the project of refining the national community.     
  Now, this attempt of purification of the national community, or fulfillment of the 
community project, can be either a conscious or unconscious process. When it is conscious, the 
project usually seeks to fulfill a political motive, and when it is unconscious the project typically 
is a result of the presentation of the community as natural and necessary. Nonetheless, Balibar 
concludes that “it is the community itself that excludes, not only in the form of bureaucratic rules 
and procedures, but also in the form of the consensus of its members, which is itself more or less 
politically ‘motivated,’” (76). It is through the imagination of the community members of their 
own communal existence that an idea of non-membership or outsider status is produced.   
  In his “Community and Ethos,” Young extends Freud’s conception of community, which 
becomes sublimated at the cost of the individual, to argue that likewise nationalism is that which 
destroys communities.  Young writes that just as actual communities become communities at the 
expense of the individual’s autonomy, when the idea of the community becomes congruent to the 
nation-state, the negative consequences of nationalism become the synonymous with the 
community. In other words, a community obliterates difference among individuals who situate 
themselves within the community, and when the definition of community becomes a national 
community, there is the same tendency for the homogenization of the “communities” within the 
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overarching national community. This theory shows how a community that is national, or 
synonymous with political borders, during its sublimation can seek to homogenize its internal 
communities, eradicating difference based upon a perceived unified cultural community.     A 
Plural Community?  
Upon defining community as that which is necessary for the nation state through its 
justification of political legitimacy yet simultaneously a constant project for the nation-state, it is 
necessary to return to the original problem of this research. Given the idea that the congruence 
with a cultural community is what gives legitimacy to the political unit, what kind of legitimacy 
can come from a community that defines itself as plural? Can pluralism be the basis and the glue 
for a wider community explicitly imagined to support/legitimize the existence of a state? Rafael 
Correra, President of Ecuador, defined plurinationalism as that which allows several nationalities 
to coexist within the larger state. Until this point, we have assumed nationality to be synonymous 
with the entire nation-state, or that which is a product of the principle of nationalism. A national 
would then be one who is a member of the congruent political and cultural community. Yet, if 
the state defines itself as having multiple nationalities within its borders, it essentially negates the 
idea of similitude between the cultural community and the political territory, which until this 
point has been a necessary congruence. With the advent of the idea of plurinationalism, it is 
therefore necessary to understand what a “principle of plurinationalism” entails, and if a 
plurinational state can exist within the framework of nation-states in which the world currently 
exists.  
The idea of a national community has made way for internal exclusions, which result 
from the condition of “otherness” being projected within the borders of the nation-state. 
Otherness then results from factors of cultural difference, namely difference of race, ethnicity or 
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language. These factors of difference can be remedied by implying a system of assimilation upon 
the national community in order to attempt to negate the cultural difference, but can these factors 
of difference be preserved and consequently allow for a community defined by heterogeneity? 
Going back to my conception of the national community as that which lends legitimacy to the 
nation-state and yet exists as an unfulfilled project, I would like to begin with the latter concept.   
The national community perceives of itself as an actuated entity, or as being fulfilled with 
its “ultimate destiny,” the nation-state, when its reality is that of an unfulfilled project due to both 
its imperfect nature and necessary constant reproduction (when reproduction is the metonymic 
name for the creation of the community on a daily basis). As the national community perpetually 
exists in a state of sublimation, it is subject to constant transformation in its attempt to continue 
in existence. In order to preserve the whole, the nation-state must adopt and transform its 
principles if it is to continually persist as the nation-state. In the case of plurinational societies, 
the sublimation of the nation comes with the transformation of one nation, congruent with the 
state, into multiple nations underneath the state’s overarching roof. In the case of a self-defined 
plurinational state, the homogenizing tendency of the national community is then transformed 
into a community defined as heterogeneous. By transforming its constitution from one that is 
national (singular) to one that is plurinational, the national community seeks to remedy the 
internal exclusions that develop when a national defines itself as being a singular, unified culture. 
Theoretically, a state defined by multiple nationalities would indeed overcome the internal 
exclusions that occur with the onset of a unified cultural identity and the assimilation of  
“otherness” that a common cultural identity is precipitated upon; however, unification is 
necessary to lend political power its legitimacy, so how will unification occur in a state that is 
marked by its diversity of culture?  
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The plurinational state, instead of imagining itself as unified by a common cultural 
community, instead explicitly imagines itself as unified by a common political community. In 
other words, instead of attempting to conceal the political connection that makes nation-states 
possible by projecting a national community as the base for the nation, the plurinational state 
does the opposite. It explicitly imagines its equality and liberty as residing in the sole factor of 
common citizenship; eliminating the need to base national community on a cultural factor. It 
casts aside the fallacy that view a singular cultural identity as the creator of national identity, and 
says instead that national identity can be multifaceted. National identity need not be singular, but 
instead can exist as plural. The crucial point here is that the political identity must remain 
unified. In order to perpetuate the existence of the state, the imagining of the community as one 
political community, rather than as one national community, allows the state to refrain from the 
assimilation of cultures, and instead perpetuate its existence as one defined by its resistance to 
homogenization. Instead of being a political theory that bases politics on culture, 
plurinationalism bases politics on being a culture of political subjects.   
The idea of a community of citizens is not synonymous with Renan’s idea of community 
as being due to its willed persistence, for as Gellner remarks, there are many entities that will 
their own existence but have not been able to achieve nationhood. Rather, a community of 
citizens takes a previously established territory, perceived to be based upon a singular cultural 
community, and transforms the idea of unity through culture into a unity through citizenship.  
Because plurinationalism occurs in an world already defined by nation-states, it does not 
have to transform cultures into defined political territories, instead it transforms the idea of a 
unified cultural community into a culture unified by its common political connection: citizenship. 
It is important to distinguish that plurinationalism does not offer each ‘nation’ its own territory, 
27  
or its own sovereignty as an independent nation. Plurinationalism still conceives of each nation 
as being a subset of the overarching political state, subject to its full political sovereignty. 
Plurinationalism, however, aims to allow each sub-nation to be an equal part of the political 
process, which would offer multiple nationalities the equality and liberty of which they were 
deprived when the nation was a singular and therefore imagined as a homogenous entity. 
Plurinationalism then creates a heterogeneous equality among its internal communities which 
identify as national. A “heterogeneous equality’ does not mean that the equality itself is 
distributed in different or unequal measures, but rather that the equality is offered to a 
heterogenous group of individuals.   
  




In conclusion, community has been a phrase that has been utilized to define an amalgam 
of groups. My focus on the national community has shown its duality as both the creator of 
political legitimacy and its unending need to be produced as a national community. Through the 
production of the people as a community, exclusions and a projection of “otherness” within the 
borders of a national community necessarily occur. The creation of internal exclusions can lead 
to assimilation or homogenization of the internally excluded other or perpetuate their existence 
as one of exclusion. Gellner’s principle of nationalism poses a distinct problem for the concept of 
plurinationalism, as the plurinational state is a disjuncture between cultural and political 
boundaries, which would seemingly violate the principle of cultural and political congruence. 
However, we understand that the political unit constantly creates a projection of congruence 
between cultural and political boundaries, and therefore, the congruence is impossible or 
unreachable, existing only as a destination. Plurinationalism precisely shows the impossible 
reality of the principle of nationalism. There is never true uniformity between boundaries, only a 
projection on behalf of the political. Therefore, the understanding of the principle of nationalism 
as an impossible goal permits plurinationalism to exist. Plurinationalism is viable precisely 
because the principle of nationalism is itself a myth. The concept of plurinationalism thus seeks 
to create equality and liberty for all communities within a nation, basing the state on a plurality 
of nations. The recognition of multiple nations underneath one sovereign state then becomes a 
community united merely through their imagining of a shared citizenship, rather than a shared 
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